Fuzzy sketches, introduced as a link between biometry and cryptography, are a way of handling biometric data matching as an error correction issue. We focus here on iris biometrics and look for the best error-correcting code in that respect. We show that two-dimensional iterative min-sum decoding leads to results near the theoretical limits. In particular, we experiment our techniques on the Iris Challenge Evaluation (ICE) database and validate our findings.
Introduction
Fuzzy Sketches have been introduced to handle differences occurring between two captures of biometric data, viewed as errors over a codeword. Many papers give applications of this technique for cryptographic purposes [1, 3, 2, 6, 7, 9, 17] but only a few investigate what are the best codes for this decoding problem, e.g. [8] , and how to find them. This issue is addressed here.
Biometric matching and errors correction
Typically, a biometric-based recognition scheme consists of two phases: The enrollment phase where a biometric template b is measured from a user U and then registered in a token or a database. The second phase -the verification -captures a new biometric sample b ′ from U and compares it to the reference data via a matching function. According to some underlying measure µ and some recognition threshold τ , b ′ will be accepted as a biometric measure of U if µ(b, b ′ ) ≤ τ , else rejected. Mainly two kinds of errors are associated to this scheme: False Reject (FR), when a matching user, i.e. a legitimate user, is rejected; False Acceptance (FA), when a non-matching one, e.g. an impostor, is accepted.
Note that, when the threshold increases, the FR's rate (FRR) decreases while the FA's rate (FAR) grows, and conversely.
Our methods will resort to information theory and coding. For more background, notation and classical results, the reader is refered to [4] and [11] in these two fields respectively.
Assuming that the templates live in the Hamming space H = {0, 1} n equipped with the Hamming distance d H , the main idea of fuzzy sketches, as introduced in [9] , is to convert the matching step into an error-correcting one. Let C be an error-correcting code included in H:
• During the enrollment phase, one stores z = c ⊕ b, where c is a random codeword in C,
• During the verification phase, one tries to correct the corrupted codeword
The correction capacity of C may thus be equal to τ if we do not want to alter the FRR and the FAR of the system. Unfortunately, the difference between two measures of one biometric source can be very important, whereas the correction capacity of a code is structurally constrained. Moreover, the size of the code should not be too small, to prevent z from revealing too much information about the template b.
Organization of this work
In a first part, we look for theoretical limits. We first modelize our problem with a binary erasure-and-error channel. Given a database of biometric data, we then give a method for finding an upper bound on the underlying error correction capacity. In a second part, restricting ourselves to iris biometric data and illustrating our method with iterative min-sum decoding of product codes, we provide parameters that put our performances close to the theoretical limit.
Model
We consider two separate channels with a noise model based on the differences between any two biometric templates.
• The first channel, called the matching channel, is generated by errors b ⊕ b ′ where b and b ′ come from the same user U .
• The second channel, the non-matching channel, is generated by errors where b and b ′ come from different biometric sources.
In a practical biometric system, the number of errors in the matching channel is on average lower than in the non-matching channel. Moreover, the templates are not restricted to a constant length. Indeed, when a sensor captures biometric data, we want to keep the maximum quantity of information but it is rarely possible to capture the same amount of data twice -for instance an iris may be occulted by eyelids -hence the templates are of variable length. This variability can be smoothed by forming a list of erasures, i.e. the list of coordinates where they occur. More precisely, in coding theory, an erasure in the received message is an unknown symbol at a known location. We thus have an erasure-and-error decoding problem on the matching channel. Simultaneously, to keep the FAR low, we want a decoding success to be unlikely on the non-matching channel : to this end we impose bounds on the correction capacity.
In the sequel, we deal with binary templates with at most N bits and assume, for the theoretical analysis that follows, that the probabilities of error and erasure on each bit are independent. Note that resorting to interleaving makes this hypothesis valid for all practical purposes.
Theoretical limit
Our goal is to estimate the capacity, in the Shannon sense [15] , of the matching channel when we work with a code of a given dimension. Namely, we want to know the maximum number of errors and erasures between two biometric measures that we can manage with fuzzy sketches for this code.
Starting with a representative range of matching biometric data, the theorem below gives an easy way to estimate the lowest achievable FRR. The idea is to check whether the best possible code with the best generic decoding algorithm, i.e. a maximum-likelihood (ML) decoding algorithm (which systematically outputs the most likely codeword), would succeed in correcting the errors.
* , C be a binary code of length N and size 2 k , and m a random received message, from a random codeword of C, of length N with w n errors and w e erasures. Assume that C is an optimal code with respect to N and k, equipped with an ML decoder.
If wn N −we > θ then m is only decodable with a negligible probability, where θ is such that the Hamming sphere of radius (N − w e )θ in F N −we 2 contains 2 N −we−k elements.
Proof. In the case of errors only (i.e. no erasures) with error-rate p := w e /N , the canonical second theorem of Shannon asserts that there are families of codes with (transmission) rate R := k/n coming arbitrarily close to the channel capacity κ(p), decodable with ML-decoding and a vanishing (in N ) word error probability P e .
In this case, κ(p) = 1 − h(p), where h(p) is the (binary) entropy function (log's are to the base 2):
Furthermore, P e displays a threshold phenomenon: for any rate arbitrarily close to, but above capacity and any family of codes, P e tends to 1 when N grows.
Equivalently, given R, there exists an error-rate threshold of
h −1 being the inverse of the entropy function. Back to the errors-and-erasures setting now. Our problem is to decode to the codeword nearest to the received word on the nonerased positions.
Thus we are now faced with a punctured code with length N − w e , size 2 k , transmission rate R ′ := k/(N − w e ) and required to sustain an error-rate p ′ := wn N −we . By the previous discussion, if
NO code and NO decoding procedure exist with a non-vanishing probability of success.
To conclude the proof, use the classical Stirling approximation for the size of a Hamming sphere of radius αM in F M 2 by 2 h(αM ) . Practical implications of this theorem are illustrated in Table 1 , Sec. 3.3.
Description
We will work with product codes together with a specific iterative decoding algorithm described below. A product code C = C 1 ⊗ C 2 is constructed from two codes:
The codewords of C can be viewed as matrices of size N 2 ×N 1 whose rows are codewords of C 1 and columns are codewords of C 2 . This yields a [
code. When k 1 and k 2 are small enough for C 1 and C 2 to be decoded exhaustively a very efficient iterative decoding algorithm is available, namely the min-sum decoding algorithm. Min-sum decoding of LDPC codes was developed by Wiberg [18] as a particular instance of message passing algorithms. In a somewhat different setting it was also proposed by Tanner [16] for decoding generalized LDPC (Tanner) codes. The variant we will be using is close to Tanner's algorithm and is adapted to product codes. Min-sum is usually considered to perform slightly worse than the more classical sum-product message passing algorithm on the Gaussian, or binary-symmetric channels, but it is specially adapted to our case where knowledge of the channel is poor, and the emphasis is simply to use the Hamming distance as the appropriate basic cost function.
Let (x ij ) be a vector of {0, 1} N 1 ×N 2 . The min-sum algorithm associates to every coordinate x ij a cost function κ ij for every iteration of the algorithm. The cost functions are defined on the set {0, 1}. The initial cost function κ 0 ij is defined by κ 0 ij (x) = 0 if the received symbol on coordinate (ij) is x and κ 0 ij (x) = 1 if the received symbol is 1 − x. A row iteration of the algorithm takes an input cost function κ in ij and produces an output cost function κ out ij . The algorithm first computes, for every row i and for every codeword c = (c 1 . . . c N 1 ) of C 1 , the sum
which should be understood as the cost of putting codeword c on row i. The algorithm then computes, for every i, j, κ out ij defined as the following min, over the set of codewords of C 1 ,
This last quantity should be thought of as the minimum cost of putting the symbol x on coordinate (ij) while satisfying the row constraint.
A column iteration of the algorithm is analogous to a row iteration, with simply the roles of the row and column indexes reversed, and code C 2 replacing code C 1 . Precisely we have
and κ out ij (x) = min
The algorithm alternates row and column iterations as illustrated by Fig. 1 . After a given number of iterations (or before, if we find a codeword) it stops, and the value of every symbol x ij is put at
then the value of x ij stays undecided (or erased).
The following theorem is fairly straightforward to prove and illustrates the power of minsum decoding.
Theorem 2 If the number of errors is less than d 1 d 2 /2, then two iterations of min-sum decoding of the product code C 1 ⊗ C 2 recover the correct codeword.
Our setting
To validate our approach, we now present the results of experiments on a practical iris database where we obtain correction performances close to the theoretical limit.
The database used for these experiments is the ICE (Phase I) database [10, 13] which contained 2953 images from 244 different eyes. A 256-byte (2048 bits) iris template, together with a 256-byte mask, is computed from each iris image using the algorithm reported in [5] ; the mask filters out the unreliable bits, i.e. stores the erasures indices of the iris template. The database is taken without any modification but two slight corrections: one eye is suppressed due to a very low quality and the side of another eye has been switched from left to right. Hence we keep 2952 images. Note that in the database, the number of images provided for each eye is variable: so the number of intra-eye matching verifications between two iris codes from the same eye is not constant. The same holds for the inter-eye matching between two iris codes from different eyes. Among all the combinations, its gives a set of 29827 intra-eye matching and about 4 million of inter-eye matching to check.
The classical way to compare two iris codes I 1 , I 2 with masks M 1 , M 2 is to compute the relative Hamming distance
for some rotations of the second template -to deal with the iris orientation's variation -and to keep the lowest score. It gives the following distributions of matching scores (cf. Fig 2) where we see an overlap between the two curves. We also see that the number of errors to handle in the matching channel is large (for instance at least 29% of errors for a FRR lower than 5%). On this channel, an additional difficulty originates from the number of erasures which varies from 512 to 1977.
Results on ICE database
We have experimented with the algorithm described in section 3.1 on this database with a particular choice for the code. In fact, the product code is constructed to fit with an array of As the density of errors and erasures in an iris code can be very high in some regions, we also added a randomly chosen interleaver to break this structure and increase the efficiency of the decoding algorithm. In so doing, we succeeded in obtaining a FRR of about 5.62% for a very small FAR (lower than 10 −5 ). This is in fact very close to the FAR obtained in a classical matching configuration for a similar FRR.
The overall size of the code could appear small from a cryptographic point of view, but following the theoretical analysis of section 2.1, it is difficult to expect much more while achieving a low FRR on this database. Indeed, from the distribution of errors and erasures on the matching channel, we obtain by Theorem 1 the practical limits which are reported in Table 1 . Remark. In [8] , the fuzzy sketch scheme is applied with a concatenated error-correcting code combining a Hadamard code and a Reed-Solomon code. More precisely, the authors use a Reed-Solomon code of length 32 over F 2 7 (with a correction capacity t RS < 16) and a Hadamard code of order 6 and length 64 (with a correction capacity t H = 15): a codeword of 2048 bits is in fact constructed as a set of 32 blocks of 64 bits where each block is a codeword of the underlying Hadamard code. As explained in [8] , the Hadamard code is introduced to deal with the background errors and the Reed-Solomon code to deal with the bursts (e.g. caused by eyelashes, reflections, . . .).
Note that in this scheme, the model is not exactly the same as ours, as the masks are not taken into account. Moreover, the quality of the database used in [8] is better than for the ICE database. Actually, [8] reports very good results on their experiments with a database of 700 images, but the codes do not seem appropriate to our case as our experiment on the ICE database gave a too large rate of FR (e.g. 10% of FR with 0.80% of FA), even for the smallest possible dimension of the Reed-Solomon code when t RS = 15.
